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THE THEORY OF PERS0N.\LITY" IN THE
PHILOSOPHIES OF BOSANQUET AND SORLEY
INTRODUCTION
A. The subject.
The subject of this thesis is the theory
of personality in the philosophies of Bosanquet and Sorley.
B. The problem.
The problem is to discover, if possible,
which of these philosophers has presented the more reasonable,
adequate and satisfactory account of personality. This will
involve, of course , comparison and contrast of their views
upon this subject.
C. The philosophical position of each
writer.
Bernard Bosanquet was^ an Idealist . There
is a strain in his thought that can be traced back to Plato.
This may be due, in part at least, to the fact that Benjamin
Jowett was one of his teachers at Oxford. Bosanquet was
an idealist of the Hep;elian school. Scott regards F.H.
Bradley, B .Bosanquet, and '^•T.Harris a,s the most represent-
ative of the modem Neo-Hegelians He was also influenced
by Lotze.
^ He died Feb. 8, 1923.
2 Bosanquet, Helen, BSAL, 24.
3 Scott, J.W., "Neo-Hegelianism", ERE, IX, 300.
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Leighton considered Bosanquet as the
greatest of the English idealists^ the objective
idealist or speculative philosopher who stands nearest
to Hegel. He notes the close resemblance between "the
movement from Kant to Hegel, and the English movement
from Green to 3radley and Bosanquet" . ^Certainly Hegel's
doctrines of the Absolute and I^egativity reappear in
the philosophy of Bosanquet.
The influence of the neo-Hegelian, Bradley
upon Bosanquet is very marked. Bradley had defined
metaphysics as an attempt to know reality; he had made
the usual idealistic distinction between appearance and
reality, and had declared for a view of the universe as a
whole. Conceiving reality as a unit and as an experience,
he had pointed out the difficulty that would face any
idealist who made the self ultimate; he had maintained
that every thinker who looked upon the universe as a
whole must do something with the problem of evil, and
although respectful towards religion, he had expressed
his skepticism concerning the existence of a personal
2
GrOd. These distinctions and suggestions Bosanquet
accepted. There were slight differences in their point
of view.^Far Bosanquet, the essence of philosophy was,
"the connected vision of the totality of things" in
which every element is subordinated to, and conditioned
by, the totality.
4
r^u^'
L^ig'^ton* "An Estimate of Bosanquets Philosophy"
rnlio Rev., 32, 625.
^ "SPadley, AP, 1, 75, 144, 197, 204, 453.
3. Cuming,Agnes, "Lotze, Bradley, and Bosanquet", Mind 26102. 4, Bosanquet, &P, 25-25. * iwiua,4;o
#
VIII
Then^ Bosanquet was an Idealist of the
Impersonal type. His "Absolute" is not personal, as will
be seen. Thus, he stands over againat what might be
called the Lotzean group of Idealists, composed of Lotze,
F. H. Green, Renouvier, Eucken, Ward, Bowne, Rashdall,
Pringle-Pattison, Sorley, and others. His position is
similar to that of Spaulding although the latter holds
reality to be "more than a person" 3-
William Ritchie ScJTley, on the other hand, is
a pluralist of the Berkeleian and Lotzean school, that is,
a personalist and theist. In his chief work so far as the
interests of this thesis are concerned, his declared purpose
is to discover what bearing ethical ideas have upon the con-
ception of reality as a whole? Ethical ideas must be given
a place, if not the first place, in an examination of realitj^
As will be seen, he gives a high place to the individual;
selves are realf His theism, also is much in evidence. He
says that his argument begins with a discussion of values
5
and ends with the idea of God.
D« The method of each writer,
Bosanquet, employing the characteristic
idealistic method--the synoptic-, appeals in a scientific
and empirical manner to life, to experienced
'^WTT'^^^^'' ^^'^ ^' Thesis 31,32.
3.** ii^lej!'%ri^^.^'^'^' 6. isorley, miG, 1.
4, Ibid. 4-5, 7. Bosanquet, piv, XVll: SbE ffi
MECP,3. '
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In spite of this emphasis upon experience,
Bosanquet was rationalistic in his treatment of philos-
ophy, for he worked upon the basis, at least the most of
his life, that logic, the spirit of totality, is the clue
to reality, value, and freedom]- This principle, otherwise
called the principle of individuality, he considered, "the
immanent criterion of the real"? Later,he saw his mistake.
He was led to recognize that the central problem of philosophy
is not merely knowledge but rather value--with its aspects
of knowledge , aesthetic appreciation and goodness^
ciorley was also scientific in his method.
Following Aristotle, he viewed the moral judgment as a
perceptive judgment; goodness, for instance, is to be
looked for in the concrete situation^ He made it clear
that his method neither implies nor justifies the approach
of subjective idealism to the objective. Constantly, he
holds science in the background, comparing and contrasting
it with ethics, Sorley deals with the concrete rather than
merely with the abstract; he goes from the particular to the
general^ he demands coherence, comprehensiveness, and
classification in ethical systems7 and is consistent in the
demand; and he uses the synoptic method. He grants that this
view of reality needs the imagination in its formation, but
denies that it is not logical and scientific, for science
involves the same exercise of the imagination as conceptions
!• Bosanquet
,
PIV, XVlll; EL, 4. 5. fc>orley,imG, 91;
^ 2. P1V,29; 6. Ibid. S9-91;
3. PIV, XVllland23;bP, 19-20. 7. Ibid. 96,99,100,
4. Mackenzie , J. S. in critical notice 102.
of bP, Mind
,
36, 484.
See also Title page of bP.
#
differ from facts perceived. Atoms, electrical units and
energy in thought are the products of the imagination.
Neither in science nor in phil-
osophyis the work of imagination,
a
mere flight of fancy. It arises out
of insight into experience.
Yet, while this is true, Sorley transcends
the usual scientific approach. The laws, the purposes, and
the propositions that determine value are not the same in
the fields of ethics and the natural sciences; in the latter,
the interest is In the universal, while in the former, the
eyes are upon the individual, **the home of value"* Sorley
deals with complete experience, which he believes is not the
subject-matter of those who restrict themselves to the
physical and natural sciences.2
E. Standard abbreviations.
The standard abbreviations used in this
thesis together with their explanations will be found in
the bibliography at the end. Unless otherwise stated, the
word "Thesis" refers to this thesis.
1. Sorley MVIG, 295.
2. Ibid, III, 85,507,
3.* IBid', 21-22.

CHAPTER ONE
THE NATURE OF PERSONAL LIFE
I. The character of true Individuality.
The character of true individuality as
held by each of our writers may be seen in a consideration
of the subject upon the basis of the division of the
nature of man.
A, An intellectual being.
In the first place, man is an intellectual
being. While the emphasis of neither Bosanquet nor Sorley
is upon this aspect of finite nature, it is recognized by
both. Mind, according to Bosanquet, is primarily conscious-
ness, and it is not a mere container.'
Sorley had a somewhat similar view.
According to him, the "Being"of Hegel would not need to
hold the germ of all its later developments; the intellect
simply endeavors to understand an object, to get at
2
reality. Both intellectual and ethical concepts are
derived from experience. Sorley' s interest- in the matter
is in preparing the way for a type of ethics based on
experience, as a substitute for the metaphysical type."^
Bosanquet, TNM, 45.
2 Sorley, kTIG, 19.
^ Ibid. 20-21.
c
2B« A social being.
Secondly, man Is a social being; upon this
both writers agree,
1. borley's conception.
Though believing strongly in the distinct-
ness of persons, borley accepted the findings of compar-
ative psychology, declaring that the Individual can not be
understood apart from his relations to society by birth,
education and business! This will be sufficient upon the
social nature of man, as his emphasis Is elsewhere.
2. Bosanquet's view.
a) The distinctness of persons.
Bosanquet likewise believed In the dis-
tinctness of individuals.
Individuality, then, is positive. It
means that what is individual, so far as it is
so, is Itself
, not merely that it is not some-
body else.^
He viewed the individual as a world In
itself? He saw the impossibility of one finite center
of experlence^possessing as its own Immediate experience
the immediate experience of another"
?
^orley, EN, 156.
rBosanouet, PIV, XX.
^Ibld^&YDl, 320.
Ibid^VDi, 47.
4 4
3This Is a Berkeleian conecption--that the
same idea can not be in two minds. Professor William
James doubted that Berkeley and his friends saw different
towns when walking the streets of London} The fact is,
that due to different contents of minds and points of view,
JBerkeley and his friends did not see exactly the same town;
the experience as revealed to them by ideas in the mind was
not the same. James could have admitted this and still have
believed in the existence of other minds for similar ideas
can be in different minds. This Berkeleian conception, though
indirectly, Bosanquet confirmed.
b) Social nature built upon distinctness
of persons.
But this very distinctness of persons was
based upon the social nature of humanity, for following
Plato, Bosanquet argued for this distinctness on the ground
that every individual has a single and separate work or
function in society. The individual is a member of the
organic whole. Thus, there is identity in diversity and
diversity in identity. There is overlapping of the
capacities and contents of minds, but the experiences do
not completely repeat each other?
c) Social nature manifested by union with
finite spirits,
Bosanquet saw the social nature of man
revealed by his association with others. At the same time,
he identified strong individuality and strong--
2 James, William, Radical Empiricism, 76-77.
Bosanquet ,VD1, 57^ '

4social TTiindedness
•
Hlfhen I most fall short of others,..
I am also least myself .Whenever we are
strong, we come together}
The soul is shaped more by social select-
ion, he says, than by natural selection, as "mind has its
Q
main environment in mind". Under the pressure of nature
and society, man is made equal to any emergency, made aware
of his unity with others and of his own value? Thus,
Bosanquet has evaluated the individual in terras of his
connection with the whole, even as the ancient Greeks
placed value upon the person in his relation to the state,
d) bocial nature manifested by union with
the infinite.
Bosanquet carried the principle much
farther; man is not only a member of society; he is a
part of the Cosmos, the Absolute. Mackenzie saw this teach-
ing as fundamental in the writings of Bosanquet.
His main contention throughout
is that an individual must not be
assumed to be an independent entity;
and that his life has to be considered
in connection with his place in the
social unity of which he is a member
and in the still more comprehensive
unity of the Cosmos.
Bosanquet saw in man a dual nature; finite
man possesses an infinite strain. Thus, he is not an
Individual existent, not an ultimate subject; he does not
possess substantive being(except indirectly) but rather
adjectival being. Here the monism of Bosanquet Is very
—
t
2!g!M|ii^^'/^;^o-
^
^ibid,
l^E5acbenzle,J.S. in Rev. or Bosanquet* s bP,Mlnd,56,4B7.

5evident.
Now the doctrine of a single Individual
Reality rests on the demonstration that no
finite individuals are self- complete and
self-contained, and that therefore none such
can be self-existing substances or irreduc-
ible subjects of prediction,'
Bosanquet began with the position of Lotze,that
to call anything a substance indicates its ^mode of behavior
rather than ascribes to it an "accult somevmat".'^ He
agreed also with Pringle-Pattison in this respect.
We both reject the old doctrine of the
soul- substance as a kind of metaphysical
atom. We both believe that the mere individ-
ual nowhere exists ;.. 'Both his existence and
his nature .., are derived.' It is absurd
to tal': of him as self-subsistent or exist-
ing in his own right,
>
He disagreed with Pringle-Pattison about men's,
having substantive being, and an adjectival being only in
the sense of relation to other reals. He rejected the term
"membership" as a description of man& posit^ion in the
Absoiiute.^ No doctrine of a Monadic self,he asserted, has
ever handled properly the self.-' He made a strong appeal
to the fact of individual differences, such as self-cont8.ined
ness,for instance, to prove that reality is on the exterior
of man, and that he is not tlaerefore a substance. \'7hen one
forgets this, and tries to be self-centered, he becoaes a
" filse appearance", not that he does not appear, but that
5he appears in a false role.
Bosanquet,LMK, 11,252; ^ Ibid. 86;
1 Ibid. 253; ^ n» 254-255;
5 LFI, 85; Ibid, 254.

6Thus, Bosanquet insisted upon the
definition of individuality at its maximum, looking for the
clue to reality in the nature of the individual at the
highest point of its self- transcendence . 1 He pointed to
the capacity of the finite being to contain that which is
contradictory to itself as proof of its infinite nature,
revealed by a circle rather than by a straight line.^ The
infinite is not remote.
So far from the infinite being
remote, abstract, unreal, nothing but the
infinite can be truly present, concrete
,
and real.
3
The discrepancies to be found in the
finite-infinite being in isolation are not ultimate; they
disappear when true individuality is won,wheji the self
finds stability and satisfaction in the Absolute.^ This
is through the process of self- transcendence . The logic
of the self endeavors to raise life into a whole.
In this procedure, egoism and altruism are
reconciled. 5 In all moral life there is a giving up and a
gaining.^ He showed that self-sacrifice is much deeper
than the thought of living for others as it depends upon a
principle which may involve the sacrifice of others as well,
the promotion of values not for the individual but for the
whole. 7" The whole is of more importance than the
^Bosanquet, PIV, 271, 274; 5sP, 175;
2pFA, XXVII; °Ibid. 176;
3lbid. XXVIII; 7lbid. 176.
4piv,251, 268;
c
7part. In this, Bosanquet went back to an expression of
Aristotle -Too RftX-oD is^VfKa.
That is to say, it is the recog-
nition by you of your place in the whole
which you belong to. ..the quality of
unity depending on the self-assertion of
the whole in the part.
Stedman saw the centrality of this doc-
trine of self-transcendence in the system of Bosanquet*
s
thought. He saw it as "an account of the many levels
and stages of self-transcendence into which reality Is
driven in its activity of self-maintenance?
C. A moral being.
In the third place, man is moral in his
nature.
1. Recognized by Bosanquet.
Bosanquet looked upon man as essentially
good-will?
He recognized the supremacy of moral
ends for man. The law of sacrifice, he said had no
special relation to conduct in favor of others, but to
moral values, and that the ideals of besuty and truth
often demand the sacrifice and suppression of others as
well of One's selft He believed in the possibility of
moral perfection; with him it was not simply progress
^Bosanquet
,
SSE, 3;
Stedman, Ralph, "An Examination of Bosanquet' s Doctrine
^of aelf-Transcendence^I, Mind> (Apr. 1931.) See also4Bosanquet, SSE, 134; / mieeliyrisht, Philip, "The Category
Ibid. 7-8. / of Self-Transcendence as an
Essential Element in the Concept of Personality'; Proceedings
or the Sixth International CofaRress of PhiloaoDhv . 1 . !
S
TTi 28
.
c
8towards the ideal.
If the ultimate real Is progress
to the infinite, the gates are closed
against perfection}-
There is one road, and one road
only,... by which the finite creature can
identify itself with perfection, and that
begins by accepting perfection as real,
while admitting that he cannot attain it
in his own right?
He held that when the reality of perfect-
ion is denied that the whole content and inspiration of
progress goes with it, for it is the spirit of perfection
"which demands and secures perfection." ^
2. Emphasized by borley.
But the stress upon morality is emphatic-
ally t)Orley*s. In the work to which reference is made
most frequentlyf he seeks for reality from an ethical
starting-point, as has been pointed out.
a. True individuality only in persons.
Sorley recognizes only persons as real
individuals. In a three-fold division of reality into
existents, relations and values, Sorley places in the
first class persons, organic life and mere things; and
designates persons only as individuals, they alone having
Intrinsic valued He proved that in the object which is
not also a subject, there is no individuality of its own.
He could find no sharp line drawn between things. In the
science that gives a broader view of individuality than
^Bo?°nquet, VDI, 503; %orley, MVIG;
3$^id 307 ^Thesis, VIII;IDl . .
^miG, 117, 120.
i
9this", the Individual self remains a puzzle or a stum-
bling block", either not explained or explained away}-
b. True individuality only in the
exercise of free choice, especially of the values of life,
Sorley restricts real individuality not
only to persons but to the free choice of persons. They
are" centers of conscious activity" characterized by free
selection of ends. He accepts the distinction offered by
another that "a thing is what it does, but a person is
what he is capable of doing." Especially in the choice of
the permanent, catholic, absolute and intrinsic values does
one attain, as well as express, real individuality.^ Only
persons are producers (or discoverers), reallzers, entertainers
("homes"), bearers, conservators, augmentors, and Judges of
values.^ Though he plead for an interest in all values,
Sorley restricted morality to the will in relation to the
moral ideal. Good-will, he called "a spirit or tendency in
which the higher human capacities and the harmony of man
triumph over sensual and selfish impulses."^ When the higher
values are chosen in preference to the lower ones, one
achieves them and the good-will of a free man^. Personality
is intensified by the attainment of values, intellectual and
feorley, MVIG, 224;
2lbid. 190;
^bid. 40-45;
^Ibid. Ill, 117, 118, 161, lo5, 166;
bid. 514;
bid. 452.
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aesthetic among the rest, since they are factors in the
completion of purpose, which is an essential aspect of
personality^
d* True individuality to be judged in
the light also of its unrealized values, and
its uniqueness.
He has affinity with the Ideals
which he approves even when he fails to
follow them; the values are his values
and have their root in the nature which
he shares with his social environment.
In this connection, Sorley quotes Plato to
the effect that the cause for the fervor of the philos-
opher's search for truth is in the fact that truth was
once a part of him; thus, the affinity between the seeking
mind and the sought truth. He points to the heterogeneity
of nature as a reflection of the differences in men quoting
Heraclltus: "Uo one descends twice Into the same stream?"
One aspect of the uniqueness of man, and thus of his worth, 1
that he brings into the world final causes by his production
of values^
D« A religious being.
In the fourth place, man is religious in
his nature.
1. Freely admitted by borley.
In religion, Sorley sees that which unifies.
J Sorley, MVIG, 166, 241;
3 Ibid. 234-235;
.Ibid. 113;
^Ibld. 167, 169.
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enriches and empowers the life of man. The moral life
Is not Isolated, is not complete in Itself; it is de-
veloped in association with church, state, home, country,
commerce and culture. The thing that binds these diverse
institutions is the religious conception of the world}
And when explanation is needed to fill in the general
picture that morality offers in the interpretation of the
universe and God, it is the religious consciousness that
comes forward, for it "claims a more intimate apprehension of
God than morality can offer"?
2. Emphatically held by Bosanquet,
a. Reaction against certain ethical con-
ceptions.
The most outstanding feature of the
religious attitude of Bosanquet is his reaction against
certain ethical conceptions and emphases of the popular
ethical societies, especially the neo-realistic and neo-
idealistic groups. In these, he says, all that is needed
as a creed is the admission that there is duty and happiness
and a world to be made better, which is a one-sided outlook.
The passions for nature, or beauty,
or morality, or truth, *may be happiness enough
in the lives of some and serve them in the
place of religion, but they are not the re-
ligious passion and only simulate it*. It seems
to me quite plain that this verdict covers
the whole of the neo-realistic and neo-
idealistic pretension to a religious attitude.
3
^Borley, ML, 131-132;|MVIG, 474;
Bosanquet, MECP, 187.
r
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Bosanquet saw in the philosophy of Gentile
a return to Kantian morality, the "ought to be" opposed to
the "is", which is a "morality of endless approximation",^
Bosanquet favored rather the view of a perfect world; of
morality as a belief in the good as real and in the bad as
unreal; and of religion as that which offers as its character-
istic faith that nothing else than the good is real, that the
highest assertion is surrender to a higher though not external
will, (the will for perfection), that perfection is real,
actually present ; ^religion that furnishes an experience in
which the evil of the world and^^he self are absorbed along
with the self in this perfection, the Absolute, and in which
self-realization is attained?
Thus it can be seen why Bosanquet har no
sympathy for the moralists, those who recognized evil as
real, who fought it, and tried to make the world better. To
him their devotion to the abstract" ought to be" was not commend-
able,
b. Morality void of religion.
Bosanquet declared that morality without
3
religion is an impossible attitude. Muirhead remarking
upon the profound conviction that Bosanquet had of the
reality of religious experience, in which man is at his best,
said:
While as much opposed as any to a
mysticism which lost the finite in the
Infinite, he became more and more sus-
picious of any form of moralisra, which
denied the presence of the Infinite, as
that which is most real in the finite selfi
~^^Hq5^ MECP. 1S3; i Hairhe^i, J. H. ."Bernard Bosanquet
= Ssi; loil^*^' " I Him". Jour.
Phil., 20.577. 675::
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Speaking of "Science and Philosophy"by Boaanquet,
picard observed that the editors defended the title on the
ground that the author believed that ethics, politics, easthetlc s
and religion speaking broadly are in the scientific field. ^
Bosanquet found that the account of the
religious consciousness given by Alexander the realist, James
the radical empiricist, and Bradley the Absolutist are much
the same* James, he said, concluded that in the religious con-
sciousness" the person is continuous with a wider self through
which saving experiences come" ."^Muirhead states that Bosanquet
valued Bradley's "Ethical Studies" because" by demonstrating
the incompleteness of the moral consciousness", it" vindicated
the appeal to religious experience"?
c. Salvation from isolation.
One is saved not only from sin, but from
isolation. In religion thus, Bosanquet saw the principle of
unity for monism, carrying it out in the idea of absor tion
into the infinite. Because it makes one realize his finiteness,
and at the same time, his unity with the whole, religion performs
a valuable service. It makes man "at home in the universe"^
It draws his attention and his hopes away from himself; it saves
him from sin and self-contradiction.
For the religious man trusts in
no strength of his own, and to be perfect
apart from that in which he trusts would
be for him sin and self-contrpdict ion,^
"'•Picard, Maurice, in Rev. of SP, . Jour. Phil . ,25 .468
.
ffiosanquet, MECP, 68-69;
^^675^' J.H.,rfBernard Bosanquet as I knew Him", Jour. Phil ..
^Bosanquet, WRI,3-6;8-9:
^Ibid. 38.
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d« Clue to reality.
Bosanquet discovered in religion, he believed,
the clue to reality. This can be seen at once by recalling the
claims that he made for religion and by thinking what is
involved in those claims. Religion regards only the good as
real; it calls for surrender to a higher will; it saves from
isolation and self-contradiction; it brings one into unity with
the infinite, and it is in this self-transcendence that self-
contradiction ceases; it makes one continuous with a wider self
through the religious consciousness. Whether, therefore, good
or the Absolute be regarded as the real, it is religion that
furnishes the clue} Speaking of the religious man, he said:
At the same time his main experience is
the clue to reality. .He is filled with 'what is
real*. He is never out of reach of the world of
values.
.
.2
II» Freedom of the Individual,
A. Definitions.
1. The definitions of Bosanquet.
He accepts and Interprets one of Berg-
son^s statements.
A free action is one which expresses the
whole *me'..,If Bergs on has a new point to make
In saying it, this point lies in his hostility
to our current self. For him, this Is a sort'ox
crust over our true or fundamental self...'^
In another connection, he follows up
this view.
. .We hold that no ideal of freedom
lies in the direction of Isolating the
self from the world. Freedom lies In the
direction towards unity and coherence.^
1 Thesis, 12-13;
2 Bosanquet, WRI, 38-39;
3 SP, 227;
4 PIV, 326.
r
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The self is "the active form of totality"
which strives towards unity and coherence, whose self-
determination is that of a logical world} In view of this he
gave a restricted definition, when he defined freedom as man's
character in morality and religiont
2, The statement of Sorley,
The following may be taken as expressing
Sorley 's view, .
The self is the cause of its own
actions; and each action although connected
with the past is yet a choice determined
by itself, a true creation?
& Importance of Freedom,
It is Sorley who most clearly reveals the
importance of freedom.
1. Relation to unity of reality.
After affirming that the world is a pur-
posive system, Sorley turns to the Individual with his
purposes and his certain spontaneity of action, and discusses
the bearing of the problem of freedom upon the interpretation
of the unity of reality. To attribute freedom to the individual
means, he says, to "limit the psychical unity of the universe",
and to give a meaning to its "causal connectedness" which is
not its"most obvious one"i That is, personal freedom and
5
causal law seem to be at odds. In its proper place, his con-
ception of this seeming conflict will be brought out more fully.
Just here all that is required is to understand that sorley
grasped clearly the importance of freedom in that
2"^Bosanquet
,
PIV, 335;
sSf, 105;
4 Sorley, MVIG, 449;
5lbid. 429;
Thesis, 21-23.
c
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he saw its connection with the unity of reality.
2. Relation to value.
When it is recalled that borley placed
emphasis upon the choice of humanity in relation to values,
and their connection with human and divine purpose, the
importance of freedom in his eyes can be further gleaned.
For God Is contemplated as communicating freedom to men that
they may attain the values which only free beings can realize
and enjoy. That is, men are free to work out both the
purposes of God and their own, to which both nature and histor
are subordinate? Thus, Sorley brings God and man together
at this point of freedom, where it is the most natural course,
in view of the dualism that seems to be Immanent in the con-
ception of human and divine freedom, to separate them. God's
purpose that values should be realized by man and in man is
accomplished through man's choice of these values, and thus
through his freedom.
C. Danger of Freedom.
This brings to the front at once the thought
of the danger Involved in freedom.
1. Sorley's view,
a. In choice and abuse of freedom.
A good choice presupposes a bad choice; the
use of freedom Involves its abuse; choice of the good
carries with it an open path towards the alternative; the
u
possibility of cooperation with God in the realization of
^hesis, 8-11.
Sorley, MVIG, 502.
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His purposes presuppose tie peril of conflict in the
refusal to recognize the primacy of those purposes; the
privilege of partnership with God is paralleled by the
penalty upon estrangement from God. Multitudes of spirits
will fail forever to realize the goodl It would seem that
God's gift of freedom to man was a dangerous gift; but the
danger is not in the freedom but in its abuse. That is,
Sorley deals with the problem of evil in such a way that he
leaves room for a personal berevolent God and for human freedom.
b» Not necessarily in pain or in an im-
perfect world,
Ylewing the world as a field for the
realization of goodness, Sorley looked upon pain as a
possible helper in that realization. An imperfect world,
also, instead of being a foe is a friend to such a process,
an absolute essential in the development of character?
All this is consistent v/ith the goodness of God mentioned
above
•
2« Bosanquet^s view.
a. In pleasure and pain.
Bosanquet, on the other hand, called pleasure
and pain the great hazards. Both he and Sorley had steered
clear of the difficulty to which idealists are liable, that
of ignoring the problem, of evil;^ both faced it; neither
denied the existence of evil. To Bosanquet, evil and pain
i Sorley, MVI& 502,473^471;|lbid.347;
^Thesis, II»
r
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Instead of being illusions were essential features of Reality.^
Evil is made of the same material as the good? It does not,
strangely, interfere with the stability of the self? Yet in
another connection, he admitted that a habit, course of conduct,
and a habitual desire could interfere with our best, that it
could silence or weaken our will to the good4 He saw the
possibility of the habit, the conduct, and the desire becom-
ing colored or infected by the evil, but evidently did not
see the seriousness of its effects upon the character, nor
its further consequences, as Sorley saw them. He saw that
suffering was much wider than sin, and could discover no escape
from it; instead of religious faith promising exemption, it
seemed to declare suffering to be inevitable?
b« In finiteness.
Bosanquet finds the explanation of danger
not in wrong choices, but in the finite condition of man.
He excused evil; it can't be helped, "it is the narrowness
of man's mind which makes him do wrong."^" Moral evil is good
hostile to good,'*'''"., .Made out of the same stuff",®
, . . The evil self is a case of
the logical striving of the self after
unity, which has brought it into con-
tradiction with a fuller and sounder
striving.
9
On the view here accepted
finiteness, pain and^jevil are essential
features of reality,"*-^
Bosanquet, PIV, 240-241; ^SSE, 106;
2 Ibid. 205; 7pi^, 352!
^Ibid.202; See b. below. ©SSE. 113;
5SSE, 110; 9pi^; 351.
WRI, 53-54; lOlbid. 240-241.
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If the danger then is in flniteness, there
is no escape, that is as long as one remains finite. Even
after one has risen above finiteness into the Infinite, the
Real, the danger trails along, for finiteness, pain and evil
are in the Absolute, essential features of reality. In
view of this, it would seem that Bosanquet would sit back
and let nature take its course; there seems to be no hope
of escape from danger and suffering either in time or in
etei'nity. But he declares that evil must be overcome.
1
How? By" feeling" that it is overcome, and by regarding it
as conquered. He sees an analogy between this, his faith,
the faith of the one who"claims the good" in spite of his bad-
ness, on the one hand, and the Justifying faith of religion,
on the other?
Thus, Bosanquet and Sorley stand far apart
both on the seriousness of the danger and its sources.
D» Limitation of Freedom.
!• Dualism in both human and divine
freedom.
Sorley squarely confronts the problem of
how the agency of both God and man is to be conceived
without an arbitrary dualism which treats God as if He
were simply one member in a finite relationship. He rejects
the answer which would mark off separate fields for the
activity of God and of man, as it is impossible to divide
raan*s life into two totally different spheres.
^
?Bosanquet> SSE, 93,96;
3 Ibid. 101; see also 100-
"^Sorley, MVIG, 470,501,-50^.
€
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The doctrine of "irresistible grace?' he finds inconsistent
with the picture of the deity who says, "Behold I stand at
the door and knock" It is in answering that call and work-
ing to fulfill the divine purposes that man finds his freedom.
Love works through freedom. Thus in the love of God and in
man's cooperation with God Sorley finds the solution of the
apparent dualism? In His love, God who has the power, does
not force open the door into any life. It is self-limitation?
And the same principle applies to man, who with freedom, the
power to bar the door, opens it to entertain deity and divine
purposes, because of love to God, Sorley does not apply the
Scripture reference above in so many words, but the thought
is there.
2. Iifcin's freedom limited by both God and
nature.
belf-determinat ion is complete only in the
infinite. God is not lim.ited by anything external to
Himself. Rather than the creation of persons being a limit-
ation upon God's power, it is a manifestation of that Dower,
for"a higher range of power and perfection is shown in the
creation of free beings than in the creation of beings
whose every thought and action are predetermined by their
Creator"^ But man is limited by both God and nature. As
was shown above, however the limitation, as respects God
is not complete. Nor is it complete from the side of nature.
{Standing between the realms of goodness and nature, man is
^Ibid. 503, on Rev. 3:21, suggested by Prlngle-Pattisonin Idea of God.
J Ibid. 504;
Jlbid.4e9;
4 Ibid.
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incompletely determined by forces outside of him. Nature
is animated by purposes} Then man is limited by heredity
as well as by environment, and by the past and his own phys-
ical conditions, the mind working through the body, which
is governed by physical laws?
A man cannot at will choose to
be a mathematician, an artist, a statesman,
or even a millionaire^
This limitation is a limitation of
experience^ Then Sorley gives a hint of the necessity of
limitation. Were each being unlimited in freedom, each
would need a world of his own to run and there would be
no universe?
JBut though limited in some respects, man
has always before him good and evil as possible objects
of free choice. Everyone can be good.
3. The freedom of man limited by the
Absolute
.
Bosanquet saw that man is limited. The
finite self is"a partial world". ^ The soul moulds and is
moulded,^ It is a stream within the Absolute, of"varying
breadth, intensity and separateness from the great flood
within which it moves''.^ This is the language of limit-
ation. He like ISorley views the limitation as partial;
the "impossible" is only relative, for finite circumstances"
cannot stand against will and character"."^
JSorley, MVIG, 427, 446-447; 5
llbid. 449-450, 469-470; 6 ibid 129'
.Ibid. 470. 7Thii
^Bosanquet, VDI,4;
r
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£• Elimination of Freedom,
1. By determinism materialism and naturalism.
Determinism, materialism and naturalism in
their denial of human freedom are naturally opposed by our
idealistic writers. Rejecting, as has been shown, ^the
doctrine of "irresistible grace", Sorley makes an important
distinction, one between universal determinism, which
denies freedom, and universal knowledge, which does not,
God foresaw that some spirits would thwart his plans,
fciorley faced with the question that naturally arises. Why
did God create these spirits then?, answers that God has
had eternally a moral purpose for the universe, and that it
will be worked out—through finite beings. Yet man is free
to make these purposes his own. Thus, fore-knowledge is not
the same as predestination.
2
Sorley sees in the theory of determinism the
tendency to be driven back unon the definition of cause as
"the agent or producing power" and declares that the agent
is not determined in the causation.^
He makes it clear that the acceptance of the
belief in the uniformity of nature does not eliminate
freedom, though it may seem that personal freedom and causal
law, he remarks, is that every event is the effect of
something else, which we designate a cause.. But the assertion
of personal freedom is not the denial of cause, but.
pThesis ,2C *
!rSorley,MVIG,472;
^Ibid. 438-439.
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rather the assertion that "self is the cause"
Bosanquet contends that instead of his making
concessions to determinism, materialism and naturalism,
that he has the only conception that will save freedom.^ Only
probable prediction of man* s actions is possible. In this,
he follows Bergs on.
By calculation, after the manner of
astronomy, you can never predict a course of
consciousness ... .You can predict, of course,
probably, from knowledge of individual
character, and its expression in analogous
situations.^
This evidently gave Bosanquet a clue. If
only probable prediction is possible when applied to mankind,
and if that depends upon knowledge of the character of the
person who is the obiect of the prediction, then one can
predict concerning another to the extent of being one with
hira. Here he leaves Bergson and maintains that we are the
same with others to a large degree.^ This is in line with
his main thesis, that persons, to a greater or less extent,
are bound up in the whole, and that there is a general will.
He agrees with yorley that "Individuality"
and "Spontaneity" are not contrary to uniformity in nature,
but rather "Include and necessitate them".^ But the right
Interpretation must be put upon these terras. If there is
to be no opposition of thought. Individuality can not mean
"empty eccentricity"; it must belong to a system which is
"self-contained and coherent".^
1 Sorley,MVIG, 430-431;
I Bosanquet, PIV, 319-320;
SP, 230;
4 Ibid, 235;
a PIV. 119;
o Ibid. 120.
r i
c
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Bosanquet seems strong upon human freedom;
he calls every step in life a creation, "at every step" an
alternative Is present, with the result that new shape Is
given the Individual and the situation,^ Yet, he admits
that the Individual seems bound. "It must pursue the logic
of the self; it must work out its nlsus to the whole;..."
Here is a "must", an emphat lc"must"that
seems to be Inconsistent with the"creation at every step".
But Bosanquet denies that giving a being a nature gives
it a necessity.^
2» By monism,
Sorley goes beyond Bosanquet in the matter,
declaring that not only do determinis, materialism and
naturalism eliminate freedom, but that monism does like-
wise. For he shows that thorough-going monism has no place
for either individual purpose or freedom. It denies free-
dom, he says, as out of harmony with the unity of the whole.
Monism must give up either the moral order or the natural
order. It can't reconcile them, and it can*t call either
an illusion."^
5# By the "strongest motive".
Then freedom Is eaid: to" i»le celMinat'ed by
the "strongest raotive"lih8ory»
a* The contribution of Bosanquet.
sanauet, anE, 151;
ZVDI, 6;
^Ibld. 7.
*borley,MVIG, 593-394.
rr I
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Bosanquet does not contribute much in
defense of freedom against the attack of the advocates of
the "strongest motive". It is true that he quotes with
approval a statement of Bergson that may bear upon the
l8sue-"To act without reason is often the best reason".
IShat does guide us when we are free is
differently phrased as 'the total of our
sentiments', 'our personal idea of happiness
and honour*
Yet he neutralized the effect of this by
saying that the individual will is shaped by its dominant
ideas .2
b. The contribution of tJorley.
Sorley says that the only basis for the
"strongest motive" is the weak basis of psychological
hedonism, which purports to give measurements. His chief
objection to it is that it treats motives as if they
had an independent existence and each a measurable strength,
The assumption overlooks the fact
that the motive exists only for the self-
conscious being whose motive it is. Apart
from the self it is nothing."^
There is no predicting what a particular
motive will do either in humanity or in the individual,
for man expresses individuality"not only by confirming
our expectations, but also by the surprises he gives us.^
F. Location of Freedom.
In place of the abstract question, "is
man free?" , Bosanquet suggested that we ask, "When, in
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what, and as what, does man carry out his will with the
least hindrance and with fullest satisfaction?**^
!• In the spiritual, supra-sensuous world.
The form of the question above indicates
that Bosanquet does not place man*s freedom in his will,
for when freedom is placed in the will, there is no
problem in obstacles in the way of its being carried out.
He explains > though not clearly, the root of will:
* A limited externality has set up
its center and representative; but its
representative being as such an active
unity, must tend to become its critic and
its re-creator,'^
The will has access to^a larger point of
view", the Absolute, which furnishes it with plenty of
material. Thus Bosanquet ^inds freedom in a world above
the material, and his will in a will above his own.^
2, In a temporal world and in self,
Kant had put freedom outside of time, in
a transcendental world, tiorley says that this can not be
done, that we can not admit only ona free act, for "the free
act unites successive moments of time into a unity of
purpose. It connects them into a single span",^ In object-
ing to Kant's account of freedom, borley has indirectly
set aside that of Bosanquet*s.
Sorley places freedom not only in time, but
also, and contrary to Bosanquet, in the self, more specif-
iclly;in the choice of the self. Freedom is best seen the
1 Bosanquet, PFA, XXVIII; ^1,96;
2 Ibid, XXIX; 4SP, 105-106,
borley, MVIG, 450-451
,
ci
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selection between alternatives. Though not alone in the
act of choosing( predispositions and suggestions coming to
him from race and environment ), one is free to follow or refuse
the suggestions.^ tiorley saw the fallacy of attributing
freedom to character and withholding it from action, if
actions are predetermined then character is also, because
of the modifying power of actions upon character*
The simple truth is that on the
determinist view both character and action
in all cases proceed from two cooperative
causes and from no others--heredit y and
environment
3, When is man really free?
Bosanquet agreed with Bergs on that many
people never do a free action, that is, that they act
from routine.
They never enter into themselves
and ask themselves what they, as complete
personalities, really want.*
Trivial choices, in which there is no
vibration of the whole personality, are not tests of
freedom,^
a. Making great, logical choices.
Man is really free, decided Bosanquet, when
he is making great, logical choices, those which stretch
over the years, which express the whole self,^and which
have for their object the universal.
It is only what is universal that Is
free from self-contradiction. It is only what
Is free from self-contradiction that can be willed
without obstruction.^ »vj-xiea
Bosanquet, bP, 228;
^Ibld. 105
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b# Making moral choices.
borley, on the other* hand, answers that a
raan is really free in the choice of higher values in
preference to the lower ones, winning thus, the good-will
of a free man.l
111. Position of the Individual in Reality.
A Introduction.
1. Reality is knowable.
Both writers defended this proposition. We
are experiencing reality all the time, contends Bosanquet;
and to the measure of our social-mindedness .2 Sorley with
his characteristic emphasis upon moral ideas found in them
the clue to reality, ^ The moral judgment is as valid as any
Judgment in the natural sciences; in neither case is knowledge
immediate; in both cases, knowledge is mediated through a
judgment passed upon a particular situation^ the judgment
being objective.^ Thus, the objects of moral judgment can be
known.
2, The interpretation of reality.
a. Bosanquet rejected the interpretations
of naturalism, pluralism an^" theism.
He denied that time is real, and that it is
any index to reality.^
2Sorley,MVIG,452.
^Thesis ,6.
4bor1 e y , IfVIG , 4- 5
;
Sibld.91-92;
glbid. 96;
Bosanquet In What tJense, if any,Do Past and Future Time
Exist?" , Mind, 6, 229-231.
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Sorley understood this to be the position of Bosanquet*!
Neither is the self real, that is per se . The sharing of
reality is a matter of degree. This is brought out by
Bosanquet in the statement of purpose in one of his
lectures , as , "An attempt to shov/ how the reality and value
of all things in the universe depend on the degree of
their embodiment of the principle of individualit y-the
completeness, coherence, or self-containedness of the
universe". 2 As has been shown, '^Bosanquet was not a
personalist. Reality is not a Person. Bosanquet rejected
the Kantian conception of a personal Creator and Governor
of the world.
4
Individuals
,
The Individual, The Absolute,The Universe.
5
Mackenzie brings out a fine distinction in the following
quotation from Bosanquet, thereby giving us a positive idea
of the Absolute ."After all, the Absolute needs us and our
conduct just as we need it".^ Mackenzie, in the same connect-
ion, commenting upon this saya:
It would seem that the Absolute cannot
be simply identified with the total world or
Cosmos..: the Absolute thought of as needing us
Just as we need it, would seem to be one aspect
of the Cosmos, Just as we are another.
gSorley, "Time and Realit y" ,Mind, ^sanquet ,PIV, 156;
b. Bosanquet 's own conception of reality.
Reality is One, an Organism of finite
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It may be that the pen of Bosanquet slipped
here, for the general impression created by him is that
the Absolute is the whole; monism can not admit two aspects
of reality* Perhaps, however,Mackenzie& coninient is an overrefine-
ment.
Perfection is not, as many moralists hold,
simply progress towards the ideal; it is real.l The religious
consciousness is part of reality;this is in harmony with the
emphasis of Bosanquet upon religion. 2 The finite world is
not an illusion; it is a "Vale of soul making".^ Mackenzie
makes this position of Bosanquet clear, 4 Then Bosanquet held
the reality of a "general will", the will of all finite
beings,^ It is part of his teaching of the whole being an
organism, end of the possibility of lives crossing, and
sharing experiences. Finally, Bosanquet affirmed the real-
ity of eternityo Time is only an appearance.^
C* The bearing of this upon the position of
the individual in reality.
All this is relevant to the problem of the
place of the person in reality. For instance, Bosanquet
saw the connection of the conception of time with life,
morality and religion.
7
d. Sorley*s view of reality.
The interpretation of reality was the goal
Sorley had in mind when he wrote his greatest book»6
^sanquet ,VDI,303;
2lbid. 229^252, 239;
^bid,92;
^Mackenzie, J.S, , Rev. Of Bosanquet 's SP, Mind ,36, 487.
^Bosanquet ,"The Notion of a General Wi iTT^Mind ,29 » 77 ,81
;
^MDl, 295-296;
^Sorley, "Time and Reality", Mind, 32, 146;
^MVIG,1.
II
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He pursues the quest of reality in the usual Idealistic
way, by reference to experience, as has been shown.
1
Human experience is material for science and philosophy.2
1) Law for the interpretation of reality.
Sorley supplies a law for the interpretation
of reality in the mandate that one portion of experience
must be interpretated by another portion. He adds that in
the appeal to experience, all experience must be included.^
2) Three divisions of reality.
He divides reality into three classes,^
existents ( persons , including the Supreme Person), things
and organic life, relations, objective and internal(ln the
sense of being within the v/hole),and values.
By linking persons and values, Sorley has
reinforced his argument for the objective reality of both.
Values are real because they are conserved and enjoyed by
persons, as well as because of their objective nnture,
existing independently of"a temporal manifestation of reality**^,
Not only then, is the individual real as having intrinsic
value, but as a discoverer, bearer and conservator of value.
Persons alone have intrinsic value. The opposition of Sorley
to any impersonalistic view of reality, such as the belief in
general will held by Bosanquet, is seen in the statement of
borley that reality is not in society. "The social mind is
realised and real in individual minds and nowhere else".^
J Thesis, IX.
5 Sorley, MVIG, 25;
Ibid. 290;
\ Ibid. 1180121;
f Sorley. MVIG, 172, 174-175;6 Ibid. 165, 24l. '
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Tet Sorley makes, perhaps an even clearer state-
ment of the unity of reality than does this monist with whom
he is being contrasted* For though borley sees individuality
in persons, an individuality that things can not claim, he
does not break up the unity of reality there-by, because he
calls the independence of persons incomplete.! His synoptic
view, so faithfully maintained, allowed him a vision of the
whole.
B) Sorley on the reality of time.
Sorley repudiates the logic that Bosanquet
used in denying the reality of time which led him to the
belief that we have no conception of time which is absolute
or final. The same might be said, comments Sorley, of our
conceptions of self, of God, and of the universe; 'Vet these
may be real, even ultimately reel,''^
4) Reality broader than existence.
Sorley explains why reality is broader
than existence. It includes the ideas through which the
meaning or purpose of existing things may be discerned,
5) God is Ultimate Reality.
Just as the logic of the impersonalist
Bosanquet drove him to the ultimate idea of the Absolute,
so the logic of the personalist Sorley forced him to turn
to God, the final explanation of the universe. Explaining
why the old proofs for theism are now in disfavor, and dis-
cussing them at some length, Sorley departs from the trad-
itional approach to the problem, asking not, "Does God exist?**
but rather, "How is the universe to be understood and inter-
preted7"So this questlon.pluralls^
„onIs» and thals™ direct
% SorleyMVIG242: „ . 5^IvIVIG,291;
2^ "Time and Reality", Mind, 32, '
^Ibid.3oi'146-149;
c
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their attention,
Sorley Is more lenient towards spiritual
pluralism than towards the materialistic type, because he
sees room for values ftnd even for a Supreme Mind in the
forraer^But he perceives that a radical pluralism requires
a universe for each self, the logical end being solipsism.
He shows how Leibniz avoided this.
2
Sorley makes an important distinction:
reality is arrived at through the cooperation of minds,
but this is not the same as the production of reality,
pluralism has won its case only when this distinction is
Ignored, or when the apprehension and construction of reality
are made one. Bat both the natural and moral orders existed
before their discovery by human minds. Thus plura 11 sV^ apart
from theism, has no explanation for this"complicated but
orderly system". The troubles of pluralism are increased
when the objective validity of moral values is granted.^ It
is however, the reluctance to admit a Super Mind that is the
chief trouble-maker for the pluralist s.* It is when Sorley is
on the topic of monism that he is in conflict with Bosanquet.
Freedom is given up and goodness made nominal by apinoza, who
for Western thought, is the advocate of m&nism or pantheism.
In this theory Individuals are rated according to their
approach to the Absolute.^ ^t Sorley wants to know why any-
thing that keeps its place should be regarded as having
^Ibid, 362-363;
ribld,367;
^ Sorley, MVIG, 371, 375, 377;
clbld, 378;
Ibid ,389.
c
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contradiction, and why anything absolutely necessary to the
whole should be called less real than something else; and
he declares that this theory fails in the acid test—the
knowledge it gives of the individual or particular.^ Kant,
he says, impressed by the discrepancy between the natural and
moral orders postulated a transcendent and powerful God as
an agency of reconciliation,^ But monism, without^personal
God has no harmonizer of the natural, logical and moral orders.
It must surrender at least one of these orders.
Defining God as "the Will to goodness, intellect
and power. Final Cause, and Final Home of Values ,4sorley takes
up the championship of the cause of theism, accepting it as
the only solution of the riddle of the universe. The whole
and all its parts are dependent upon one tiupreme Mind.^ It
is in this way that he finds unity in the universe. He speaks
of the universal and natural tendency to designate beauty,
truth and goodness as div ine^^ature, and likeness to that
nature to the extent of participation in goodness.^ In this
lew the purpose so apparent In the world Is the purpose of God.
Finite minds achieve unity with this Supreme Person not by the
absorption of their individuality, but by the perfection of
their characters in association with that Mind, especially In
carrying out divine purposes, borley uses the term" Absolute'*
in the sense that there is nothing independent of God*'s nature
and will, but it is interesting to note that he preferred the
term "Perfection" in the designation of God, for this is the
term to which Bosanquet had assigned reality, but with no
personal content^
\ Ibid. 388-390; §Tblrt '^n'?.
I Ibid 392; ^Ibld:4g|;473.
^
Thesis, 24; '
Sorley,MVIG, 466,487;
€
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B. Relation of the individual to reality.
1. Part of the whole, for the sake of the whole,
Bosanquet viewed the person as a part of the
organic and perfect whole. ^ But by saying that the Absolute
needs us, ^ Bosanquet has ma,de man^ relationship with reality
an ideal rather than an intrinsic one. Man should consider
the interests of the whole. •
2. Part of the whole for the sake of the
individual
.
Sorley,on the other hand, views the individual
from the standpoint of the individual. The Absolute is not
perfect; it needs to be improved.'^ The adaptation, correspon-
dence, and cooperation among persons a,re for the good of
each.^ Man is an agent, not a victim, in the changing of the
worldfe course A Nature is a field for the development of
human character.
^
IV. Goal of the Individual,
A. Introduction.
Though they differ upon the nature of the goal,
both of our writers agree that there is an objective toward
which every person should strive.
B* particular examination of the problem.
Is the goal:
1. Life, that is, adaptation to environment or
self-preservation?
It is Sorley who brings up, and disposes of, this
view. Recognizing that life, though variously termed,
^Thesis, 29. ^IG, 25;
2sorley, EN, 133,136; ^EN, 133.
3lbid. 223-224;
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is the goal held by some evolutionists for p11 beings, Sorley
describes the effect of applying the theory of evolution tc
ethics, having the example of iSpencer in mind,-^ Spencer had
argued that race-preservation and self-preservation evolved
together, and that therefore egoistic and altrListic trends
become harmonized, while the moral life assumes the nature of
a"moving equilibrium approaching completeness," Sorley ob^^ects
to this view, pointing out that individual and social welfare
are sometimes in both seeming and real opposition, that on
this view man is governed from without, and that an equilibrium
which is motionless is at variance with spe%er*'s concept of
the increase of life through evolution, and that harmony with
environment may come through another method, --a method recogn-
ized by evolution, -the subordination of circumstances to the
self .2
Sorley concludes that only conflicting results
come from applying the theory of evolution to ethics,^ that
the theory gives no satisfactory goal of conduct, either
independently or in cooperation with hedonism,^ and that life
(adaptation to environment, or self-preservation) is not the
goal of human endeavor,
2. Happiness?
Consciously or unconsciously, Bosanquet and
aorley join forces against hedonism,
b. Bosanquet denied it.
Though believing that hedonism was on the gain
among idealists,^ Bosanquet rejected it for the following
reasons
:
1) Perfect happiness not the ideal of
IKoriey.EN, 247; 272,273, 283,303, 304 308-309
2 ibid/bl, 248,^51,258; 4 Bosanquet . "fifed oiitsm among idealists
Mind, 12,202,
c
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perfection* This would mean, said Bosanquet that the
misery of the lost in Hell, would contribute to the joy
of the saved In Heaven, that is if these are true concept ions
.
2) The ideal, happiness, withdraws attention
from the Absolute, and present values. This is a serious
offense, for to Bosanquet the Absolute, not happiness, spells
perfection; and pain has a place in the Absolute.
2
3) We demand not pleasure but satisfaction.
This reason is linked with the one above, for
satisfaction, according to Bosanquet, is attained only by
absorption into the Absolute.*^
4y It is mistake to lay down in advance any
object of satisfaction. That is like binding a physicist,
he said, before he begins his science to the terms in which
he is to explain phenomena*^
5) It is an inconsistency to make feeling the
criterion of the goal. We ascribe moral reasonableness to
purposes of action; this, he inferred, is not in harmony
with regarding feeling as the criterion of the goal.^
6) Pleasure is not the good, but a good. "We
see that pleasure is only one thing among others that are go§d^
7) The universe can not be regarded as a place
^Banquet, PIV, 18;
gibid, 19;
^bld. 244; SP, 215,201;
4bP, 215-216;
f'Will and Reason" ,Monis t ,2, 27;
^E, 50.
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of pleasure.^ This is consistent with his belief that
this world is a "vale of soul-naking" , and that hazards
and hardships are essential features of reality and
inescapable by finite beings.
b« Sorley also denies it.
Is pleasure or the more general conception,
happiness, the goal of life? "No", answers Sorley, and for
several reasons:
1) The notion is too general. Plaasure
attaches itself to values of every kind, instead of itself
obeing one kind over against the others.
But, even were it still the case, as
it was in the time of Aristotle, that nearly
all men were agreed as to the naae of the
highest good, and tha.t the common people
and the cultured alike called it happiness,
the difference as to what they meant by the
term would still remain.
3
2) Pleasure is not the 50od;only some pleas-
4
ures are good.
3) The standards of both hedonism and
utilitarianism are impractible. Pleasure can not be meas-
ured.^ These systems stand by, unable to give suggestions
on the means of the improvement of the human mind.°
4) Happiness is limited. When dependent
on external conditions, it shares the limitation suffered
by knowledge and by aesthetic values, while moral
^3osanquet,PIV, XVIII. ^Ibid, 3C;
2Sorley, imG, 30 ^EN, 67.
^EN, 7; see also 218 & LIVIG, 28;
^Mvia, 29;
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values are not limited in the same way,"*-
5) The utilitarians are inconsistent. In
his review of'The English Utilitarians", Sorley gives a
comprehensive view of the inconsistencies of this group,^
6) Pleasure in actual experience can not be
set alwaya over against pain. While pain is connected with
hindrances, pleasure comes in their removal. The desire
for life modifies conditions so that pleasure may follow
from almost any course of conduct*^
7) It is impossible to determine the greatest
producers of pleasure. The possibility of"the modification
of function and feeling in the evolution of life" makes it
impossible to say, declares aorley, what will produce the
greatest amount of pleasure.^
8) Hedonism based on the theory of evolution
argues in a circle.
Pleasure as the end is seen to
be only definable as life or activity,
although it was adopted as the end in
order that by Its help we might dis-
cover what life or activity meant as
the end for conduct.^
9) The dignity of man is not upheld by
adopting this goal.
^orley,WIG, 50.
TJorley, Rev, of "The English Utilitarians", by Leslie
btephens. Mind, 10, 553; See also EN, 44-45,32,47,51,70,77
2- and HEP,2bl;
Eil, 239-240;
*Ibido 240-241 with 35;
^Ibid. 241; see also 73*
f1
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If pleasure is the only end, and
satisfaction is simply another name for it,
then it is plainly incorrect to say that
'it is better to be a human being dis-
satisfied than a pig satisfied; better to
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satis-
fied*
10) The world-order is not a moral order if
creation is viewed as providing maximum happiness for
conscious beings.^
11) Hedonism is contrary to theism.'^
3» Absorption into the Absolute?
A* Bosanquet.
It is the conviction of Bosanquet that this
is the goal. Under the influence of Bradley, and reacting
against Berkeley, Bosanquet turned from the self to the
Absolute, the organic whole of selves, Berkeley, regarding
minds as the one reality had failed to orge^nize them. This,
Hegel had done by bringing individuals into the Absolute,
This conception was mediated by way of Bradley to Bosanquet.
1) Nature of the Absolute,
That the Absolute is not a person has already
been made clear. 4 it is not to be confused with the idea of
God, which some philosophers use, for Bosanquet calls atten-
tion to the omission made by Pringle-Patt ison of a distinction
between God and the Absolute.^
The Absolute is limited, and characterized by
1 Sorley,EN, 206; ^ ^ee also
, Bradley ,F.^I.
^ Ibid. 344; Essays n Truth and Resality,
.
It>id. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914, 428.
^ Thesis, 29,
5 Bosanquet, Rev. of "The Idea of God by
Pringle-pattison, Mind, 26, 478-479,
I
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negativity which does not disappear when contradiction is
removed from individuals, but remains a real characteristic
of the whole. ^Then Bosanquet states and restates that the
Absolute contains time.^
2) Transmutation of persons and Nature.
Into this Absolute, finite individuals are
absorbed. Expanded to the maximum of their personality,
they are "transmuted" into the whole. ^ The beginning of the
process is to cease thinking of ourselves as separate beings,
^
V^e do not possess substantive being, but only ad.5ectival belng.^
Into this Absolute also, as related to finite mind, Bosanquet
puts nature.^ Thus it contains all experience.
b« Sorley.
Sorley rejects this goal put forward by Bosanquet
for two reasons:
1) Meaningless, in some respects.
First, infinite to f inite. . . .Then
finite back to infinite , . . .Does not
the whole process in which the finite
is pushed out into apparent reality
only that it may get pushed back
again-seem meaningless? It would not
be meaningless if the finite brought
back to its source a value gained from
its adventure in time; but this would be
to enrich the infinite-a palpable con-
tradiction.'''
Vicard , Maurice , in Rev. of Bosanquet *s SP, Jour. Phil. , 25
468.
^Bosanquet ,SP, 115, 118 , 122 ,224; MECP. 153;
^PIV,373;
-Ibid. XXXI;
^Fl, 75-76;
°PIV, 571;
'Sorley, "Time and Reality", Mind, 158.
t_^ -
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2) Irrational in other respects.
Sorley Is not in favor of the unreasonable
conception of absorption into the Absolute being put
as a goal before men. According to this theory what the
favored few attain in this life - unity with the Infinite,
the wicked as well as the righteous attain in the end.
Then the experience of the mystics to which Bosanquet
appealed is exceptional; their interpretation of their
experience may not be sound. There is not the distinction
between man and God that is required to substantiate this
appeal to religious experience.
For most men the religious experience
not only starts with the finite individual;
but also finds the individual ' born again' by
union with the Infinite. Without the distinct-
ion between God and man it is as impossible
to Interpret the religious life as it is to
Interpret it apart from their union. The
believer does not trust in himself...
Bosanquet receives no confirmation for his
theory from the experience of the philosophers, declares
Sorley, for they do not become God as the mystic is said to
become; "they only seek to describe the infinite whole",
into which the mystic is supposed to have been lost.
^
Then it was partly the ambiguity in the term
"Absolute" that caused Sorley to choose instead the term
"Perfection ,for the former term can be too easily
identified with the term "God".^
Having thrown out the notion of absorption
into the Absolute, what goal will Sorley substitute?
1 Sorley, M^/IG, 157;
2 Ibid. 495.
f*
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4, Goodness?
a. Bosanquet answered "No"«
Goodness, ... cannot be the moral end.
If we make it so, it loaes its content and
collapses into nothingness. The world that
conditions our goodness must not exist
merely for our goodness sake, but must sub-
ordinate it to some concrete need or
natne.
'
b. Sorley answers, "Yes".
He advances several reasons for his affirm-
ative answer.
1) Goodness is a definable and appropriate
goal; he admits that it can not be pointed out as a
tangible object can be, but it is indefinable only in
that sense. 2 He considers it an appropriate goal for two
reasons:'^ The idea of goodness is valid for the universal
order, and it harmonizes withL the nature of- man.
2) A theistic and authoritative goal. The end
is Qot absorptio n into the Absolute but rather partner-
ship with a personal infinite Being. More- specifically,
the goal is perfection of character through such
co(5peration.^ This personal God has "charged" the world
of persons with the discovery and realization of values.
This goal gf goodness is then also authoritative.
Bosanquet, PIV,26;
Sorley, SE, 51;
MVIG, 485,496; EN, 4;
Thesis, 35.
cf
t.
44
The notion of ' ought Implies an
obligation to pursue a definite end or
conform to definite rules regarded
generally as coming from an authoritat-
ive source.^
Thus the purpose in the world is the purp-
2
ose of a Supreme Mind.
3) A freely* chosen goal.
Though it is an authoritative goal, it is
also, finally, a freely-chosen goal. It can be rejected.
This accounts for the liability of failure. In Bosanquet's
conception, there was no"tf^ Iking back" to the process; every
individual "must work out its nisus to the whole". ^ but in
borley*s view, while there is a sense of obligation coming
from the recognition on the part of the individual of a
supreme mind, there is the sense of freedom that is allied
with the dignity of moral beings. Goodness is open to the
choice of every person.
Thus, these two writers have given us their
conceptions of the nature of personal life. Exposition
rather than criticism has been the aim in the comparison
and contrast upon the various points.
^Sorley,El?, 8;
^IG, 474, 466.
'T'hesis, 24.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DESTINY OF PERSONAL LIFE
I» Is there Berpetuatlon of Fersonal Life?
Where shall we look for an answer?
A. In the realm of moral values?
1« £osanquet.
In the field of ethics, Bosanquet found no
answer to the question of future existence. Upon this point
he maintained the attitude he took concerning the light that
ethics throws upon the nature of personal life. He discovered
in the realm of moral values no solution to the problem of
personal existence because of his indifference towards any
arguments upon this subject that might be drawn from ethics.
He granted that it was natural to believe in conscious
future existence. This belief is voiced in poetry,^ and in
philosophy. The ghost of the two-world theory is continually
rising from the dead"to haunt the common-sense thinker. The
"old convictions" of compensation found in the Bible were well
known to the Greeks and to many other nations.^ Meliorism is
found in several present day philosophies .4 The question, "Does
the conservation of value imply the conservation of personality-
or this or that personality or of any?**, raised by Mr. Tsanoff
did not provoke any direct answer from Bosanquet, who while
admitting the inexhaustibleness of values, manifested his
Bosanquet, SP, 102;
"Discussion", Phil.
R
ev
'SP, 336;
\SECF, 120-121.
28,336;
r*
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indifference towards, and impatience with, any applications
which might be derived from the conservation of values. ^ This
indifference is expressed in another connection.
The principal thing that matters is the le'vel
and fulness of mind attained. The destiny and
separate conservation of particular minds is
of inferior importance and merely instrumental to
the former.^
Bosanquet went beyond the point of indifference,
however, for he denied the logic of deducing the conclusion
of immortality from any premise of the conservation of value.
To identify the conservation of values
with the permanence or survival of given
personalities, as Professor Varlsco appears
to do, is to my mind an extraordinary assum-
ption.^
2. Sorley.
Sorley, on the other hand, to be consistent, is
expected to answer that a solution to the problem of the
perpetuation of personality is to be found in the realm of
moral values. This expectation is verified ^or he binds up
the conservation of value with the conservation of personality;
only persons are bearers of value. 2 For values to persevere,
then, persons must persevere. He argued for the conservation
of value'^appeallng to the law of compensation in nature(for
instance, the conservation of value even when institutions
and beliefs connected with them perished) and to the object-
ivity of value, contending that a unlverse"whlch upholds and
contains these objectively valid values'* will not allow them
Jfiosanquet, "Notes" , Phil .Rev.
, 30, 216;
jjPIV, 20;
Ibid.
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to perish, but rather will "provide some means for their per-
manent realisation.""^ He explains the relationship existing
between the survival of persons and of personal values. Are
values to be lost? They will be lost. If free minds cease to
exist, or become absorbed in God. If either of these tragedies
occurs, the question that forces Itself upon us Is, are the
values which men throughout history have fought and died to
preserve, worth the sacrifice? ^
B« In the realm of religious values?
1« Bosanquet did not go where he usually went
for an answer,
IJaturally, we expect to find Bosanquet true to
his characteristic emphasis upon religion. Instead, he de-
nied that the survival of living beings had any special
religious interest in it,^and condemned traditional religion
for its separation of man from the lower animals in its dis-
cussion of the destiny of man.^
2» Sorley finds a solution in this field.
On the other hand, Sorley with his emphasis upon
moral values, makes a statement, which though general, has an
Important bearing upon this problem: "So far as the individual
problem gets a solution at all, it is usually through the
religious faith of the individual person."'''He calls attention
to the view held by Hoffdlng that the permanent and essential
element in religion is a faith in the conservation of value.
inosanquet PVI, 21 , footnote . ^„ ^ . ^,
Isorley I^VIG, 172-175;
'^Tl '^T^^,
^Ibid. 175: ^SbE, 79, with, 73-75,
^Ibid. 526 Sorley, MVIG, 514,
cr
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Sorley thinks that it ehoiad be called a postulate rather
than an:. axiom. Yet this does not weaken this appeal to
religion for proof of the conservation of value through
the continuance o f persons alone, because -the conservation
of energy, likewise regarded as an"anticipatlon of experience','
is also a postulate*'
C« In the realm of philosophy?
1« Bosanquet's negative answer.
Philosophy gives no warrant for the assumption
of a future life based upon the existence of two worlds; this
is the thesis of Bosanquet Ih his review and translation of
"The Philosophy of Fine Arts" by Heg el. The latter taught
that "the two worlds" are inseparable, all men living in
some degree in both.
The 'things not seen'
,
philosophically
speaking are no world of existences or of
intelligences co-ordinate with and severed
from this present world.
2
The spiritual world is the present world, said
Bosanquet, pointing to the false antithesis between menial and
physical vision; the "seeing eye is always the mindS eye".
He concludes that the distinction betv/een sense and spirit is
within the mind,^ Bosanquet remarks upon the absence of the
obscure "beyond" in Hegel's system, and the feeling that he
gives the reader that he is dealing with the real, "the deepest
concerns of life", Bosanquet believes that no really great
philosophical or religious teacher can be understood unless we
grasp the distinction between the two worlds as a distinction
between aspects only of the present and known world. Some of
' Sorley, MVIG, 160; ^ Ibid. XXII-XXIII, SP,324.
2 Bosanquet,PFA, XXIII,
SP, 325;
r1
*
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these teachers, he granted, Indulging their imaginations, did
separate the present and known v/orld from the future unknown
world, but he thought that their purpose was to bring the
other world within our reach. ^Bosanquet denied that the con-
ception of persons living through endless ages, persons whom
we shall meet in the future, was a philosophical conception.
Such a world, whatever we may think
about its actual existence, is not the
'other world* of philosophy. The things
not seen* of Plato or of Hegel are never
a double or a projection of the existing
world. Plato indeed wavered between the
two conceptions. «. .But in Hegel there is no
ambiguity. The world of spirits with him
is no world of ghosts.
^
Does philosophy give hope as well as guidance?
Bosanquet believed not, considering the very essence of Hegel-
ian thought to be that philosophy has nothing to do with the
"barren forms of thought that are always in a world beyond",
its object being something concrete and present.*^
And thus an opinion supported by
thinkers for whom I have a profound
respect A.E. Taylor, In particular seems
to me untenable, the doctrine that is,
that philosophy gives hope not guidance.^
The result was that Bosanquet found no solution
to the problem of immortality in the realms of ethics, religion
and philosophy.
1
Bosanquet ,SP, 322;
|Bosanquet,PFA, XVII ;SP, 521; See"Discussion"
, Phil, Rev.
,
28,290.
fPFA,SV; SP, 320 from Hegel's Logic (Wallace tr.), 150:
^PIV, 19.
r
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2. Sorley's aff irmat ion.
Not only did Sorley place confidence in the testimony
of moral values respecting the future; he also looked to
philosophy for hope concerning the future as well as guidance
for the present, Sabin in a review of iSorley's chief work,
notes that the author conceived the business of philosophy
to be the achievin^-^hat tsabln chose to call"the grand view",
namely the view that the moral order is an eternal order.^Thus
Sorley gets hope as well as guidance from philosophy, because
to him an eternal moral order spells the preserving of moral
values, which in turn implies the perpetuation of persons as
the preservers of values. Thus, Sorley finds assurance for
personal future conscious existence in the fields of ethics,
religion and philosophy.
11. How shall Eternal Life be described?
A. Extension into another world, or mere complete-
ness in this world?
1* Mere completeness, the decision of Bosanquet.
We are spirits, and our life is one
with that of the Spirit which is the
whole and the good. Then, surely, we are
externa 1.2
This appears to be an affirmation of the extension
of personality beyond the bounds of this life. But evidently
he had only present self-completeness in mind, for while he
granted that it was natural to cling to the idea of extension,
and natural to connect the reality of values with the"per-
slstence of particular souls", ^he did not see how the idea
could be defended.
2 t'o^aS^uft':'w'Rl!l6f'-"'^Vryv/"l-' 16.609-614.
Ir
€
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Our being and our destiny are still
thought of in terms of linear progression;
and the inherent demand for self completion
is construed as a desire to 'go on' snd
continue our achievement in propria persona .
...If we do not*go on*' in person so it is
implied, our values lose their reality.
I do not see how it is possible to maintain
any attitude even remotely resembling that I'
Clearing up what he considered a misconcept-
ion regarding infinity, Bosanquet described the desire for the
extension of personal life as "a sickly yearning" to eacape
from the real, which as the true infinity is concrete, present
and valuable.^ Here he clained to follow Hegel who he said,
used the terra"infinit y" to picture what is most real and
most precious in life, self-completeness or satisfaction
rather than endlessness. He denied that the concept of end-
lessness is a part of the concept of completeness of person-
ality.
The student or statesman who longs
for continuance in which he may 'complete
his work' -some task in the universe analogous
to his function on earth, is thinking mainly
of those high values of which great individuals
are the vehicle. One dares not say that he
is wrong; but the consideration of the vast
masses of humanity suggests supplementary
ideas.
^
Perfection is found in the present eternal
and absolute order instead of in any future order.
^
2. Extension as well as completeness, the
belief of Sorley.
Basing his claim largely upon the essential
relation existing between values and persons, Sorley is
convinced that there must be a future life in the sense of
both completeness and extension.
2 Bosanquet, SP, 327: pfa v^CXIV:Bosanquet ,SP, 102.
^ SSE,84;
4 Albee
Phil
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Pop What purpose the Infinite pain and'.
effort of Individuals if their free conscious-
ness must be relinquished, perhaps Just when
it has proved itself worthy of freedom?...
And if free minds when perfected, are to pass
away, even for absorption in God, then that
value is lost; and we must ask again the
question, with less confidence in the answer,
whether the values which the world's history
offers are worth the price that has been paid
for them.
B» Conscious future existence or continuity of
values of the race or of individual influence?
Bosanquet bbjected to any interpretation of
Green that would make it appear that Green taught that the
finite self is eternal. He did admit that Green at times
taught"something like continuance of personality after death,
but denied that it was on the basis of an" eternal finite self."
Bosanquet criticizes Taylor for his interpretation of "Eternal
Self" a phrase used by Green as an ultimate, underived, finite
Individual, Bosanquet understood it to mean instead the divine
mind or world-consciousness
And it is very noticeable that the
true or real identity of the self is not,
for Green, present prima facie in the in-
termittent consciousness of man.^
Asking, "What destiny can we consistently desire,
Bosanquet answers the question, by saying that no one will
much object to an identification of the self with the things
he cares for.^ He believes that a man will be contented to know
that his"maln interests"will be safeguarded. For this conscio\:E
future existence is not necessary; the continuity of the race
would conserve these values. Naturally, too, the immortality
of individual influence would depend upon the continuity of the
race. This Bosanquet substitutes also for the immortality of tfe
f'SoPT^rrMVIG. 525; ^^Ibld. 157;
Bosanquet, SP, 155 on Green's Works ,1,115; VDI,260.
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individual himself.
Nearly all mankind rest in unvisited
tombs, and' leave behind them a common
undistinguished work, and it is the value
of the general life that we have been trv
ing to appreciate and aspiring to share.
^
As will be brought out in an indirect way in
the discussion of Eternal Progress, aorley believed in the
conscious future of the individual.
2
C. Future compensation?
Meliorism, reliance on the future to complete or
compensate for the past, Bosanquet found to be held in common b
neo-idealism,neo-realisra pragmatism, instruraentalism and a
certain type of religion, in which systems the progress of the
race is the fundamental feature, and the good is in the future,
to be won by struggle and by "prolonged and collective endeavor
Prom the religious side are "the old convictions about heaven
and the kir^dom of God, the invisible world where wrongs will
be righted"and man will be"compensated for their good and
evil deeds".
All these ideas-compensation, rewards
and punishments, God's commands in the Bible
the authority of the clergy-are connected
together. They are all fancies that men have
had, just as though they were children, and
being children knew that they must be treated
as children. Children do things because they
are told, .
.
He thought that these"fancies" did not occupy a
large place in the New Testament. He admitted their power
for good in some respects, as ii;i the elevation of man* s con-
ception of himself and the value of his soul, but at the same
time he lamented their evil effects.
r(
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But it has made them careless of the
world in which they live, and has narrowed
their notions of duty and manliness. Life
must not be split up into a present of en-
durance, and a future of en:5oyment .
i
Bosanquet was pleased to read in the New Testa-
ment that the Apostle Paul was ready to relinquish his
reward
in order to save souls. He told the story of the
young man
who was afraid to go to the rescue of people in a flood, lest
he go to Hell in case he lost his life, and to whom an old man
shouted »" Better be damned doing the will of God than saved
doing nothing".
2
Sorley seems to have written nothing upon the
future life viewed as a state of compensation,
D. Eternal progress?
!• Bosanquet.
In spite of his advocacy of a perfect world and
his antagonism to progress towards perfection, Bosanquet made
an admission, which however is not very clear or emphatic.
The progress, being rooted in the
ultimate conception of reality as becoming,
is conceived as necessarily unending, but it
is not admitted ...to merit the disparaging
addition of progress ad infinitum .
*
Just what the distinction between progress
unending and progress ^ infinitum, it is difficult to see.
perhaps he thought that the former adjective harmonized better
with his conception of the Absolute, to which he is not reluc-
tant to concede eternal life ,if that life be in this world
rather than in another.'^
^Bosanauet,SP, 334; ^^MECp. 119:
SBosanquet ,SP, 335; 4 Thesis, 51.
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2. Sorley.
Sorley also held, although more clearly and con-
sistently, that progress Is unending. After goodness has been
achieved, after moral perfection has been won, that is, after
harmony has come between will and ideal(a perfection he held
to be possible in this world ), adventure will not cease, pro-
gress will not stop. This is because the mastery of evil is
only one phase, the negative phase, of perfect ion.Enterprise
and achievement will go on after victory has been won over sin,
even after the victory over death. There is infinite progress
because there is no place to stop, either in time or in eternit
We must press on into"the Unknown" to make all things sub-
servient to the values we must realize. According to our
capacity, we shall be fitted for nobler service.
Bat if free minds endure, it must be
for a range of activity suited to the
capacities and values which they have
acquired in their mundane experience.
And if here or elsewhere they attain that
complete harmony between will and ideal
in which perfection consists, they will be
fitted thereby for nobler enterprise,!
Sorley, MVIG, 525.
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CHAPTER THREE
GERERAL CRITIQUE OF BOSANQUET MD SORLEY
I. Sorley.
A, Criticism of Sorleyl Conception of man.
Among the very few critics of the work of
Sorley tnat were found, Inge was the severest.^ He objected
to the idea of the individual as the home of values; Sor-
ley should have placed his faith in tne conservation of
value in a personal God as does Varisco. Sorley"clings to
the idea of a progressive increase of value in tiqie", which
endangers values because science teaches that time villi at
last wipe out all human achievements", Inge declared that
if moral va±ues are eternal, it is not in time, but in the
unchanging mind of God. He thought that he discovered in
Sorley a wavering between personal Idealism and platonism.
He considered Sorley h "exclusive preoccupation with morality,
which can hardly exist as sucn, in the eternal world',' Hhat which
makes him so indifferent to the Platonic conception of
value
.
It may be that Sorley wavered between personal
idealism and Platonism. He viewed tjie individual as the
home of values, a-nd he contended for the objectivity nf
values. But there v/as no denial of the presence of values
in the Supreme Individual, and no denial of His eternity.
Sorley does not view the finite individual as independent
2
of tne Infinite. In this viev^, there seems then to be no
4nge, Rev. of HVIG, Mind , 28, 236-238. 2Thesis,34.
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danger of the destruction of values when the temporal
order is destroyed. And it is not necessary that morality
"as such " continue to exist in the eternal world. It is
^ doubtful wnether anything in the temporal order will for-
ever exist "as such".
Barker praised the second lecture of "Recent
Tendencies in Ethics", by Sorleyas the most masterly
criticism of Evolutionist ethics that he knew. ^ Inge, in
explaning the object of Sorley in writing his best book,
referred to his doctrine of values as a "branch of philos-
ophy which is more and more coming to hold a central
2
position" in idealism,
Sorley successfully defended his ethical found-
ation. The criticism of Bosanquet directed against the
moralists wno hold a narrow view of reality did not strike
Sorley because he plead for complete experience and an in-
terest in all values.''' Neither was Sorley a victim of the
charge of holding the finite individual as an ultimate, and
having, thus, nothing aoove it to inspire it on.^ For Sorley
ed
view man not as ultimate value but rather as the bearer of
values, the Ultimate being a transcendent God who urges man
on to his best.
B. Criticism of Sorley^ view of God.
Sabin, speaking for the empiricists , called the
^1 problems v/ith which Sorley v^restled, the problem of the
reconciliation of the moral and natura.1 orders, a.nd the
problem of evil, "artificial" because they had their source.
^Barker, Rev. of Sorleyfe RTE, Mind, 13, 418.
2 Inge, Rev. of imG, Uind
.
28,TI^.
jThesis, IX - X.
Bosanquet, PIV, 25.
c
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siie said, in "certain theistic assmptions" . ' But ife is
one who used the empirical method against whom this charge
is made. And Sorley did not start with the assumption of
God. Ke began with vaiues, argued upon the basis of exper-
ience, and finally arrived at the conclusion that there
must be a God to give unity to the universe. It was
Sabinl failure to see this that caused her to censure the
synoptic method used by Sorley to arrive at theism.
1
In this reasoning, Sorley avoided on the one
hand pluralism, with its universe of independent persons and
lack of unity, and on the other hand,monism with its sem-
blance of unity at the expense of real personality.
It is interesting to note the relation of
Sorley to a group of theists, Methodist theologians of the
past and present. Sorley rejected the rationalistic argument
offered by Kant and Schleiermacher as did Watson. Sorley did
not use the intuitional defense of theism which Raymond em-
ployed. Sorley approached the problem as did Curtis, in an
empirical manner. Sorley stands over against Sheldon wno
made little use of the mora,l or evaluational ar^mient, Sorley
combined the theistic arguments even more than did Terry, who
united the ontological with the cosmological and causal argu-
ments. Sorley and Bowne , believing that Kant ha.d well-nigh
demolished the old theistic arguments, founded their theism
on the belief in a cosmic universe and on a personal world-
ground.
G. Criticism of SorleyS attitude toward
immortality.
While Bosanquet used "eternal" in an unnatural
^Sabin, Rev. of MVIG, Jour .Phil. , 16, 6l2-«n.
Vr
59
way,Sorley used it in its most obvious meaning. Extension
with th.e inspiring addition of eternal progress for the
individual is much to be preferred to the- conception of
completeness in time merely, especially since the growth
suggested in the term is not the grov^th of the individual
but of the Absolute. Sorley did not "split" life up into
a"present of enduoance and a future of enjoyment" . ^Rather,
life is a whole, bound together by value, purppse, and
eternal progress. In such a theory there is no room flor
carelessness toward the present life, \7hile the moral out-
look uppn the future life is not the only one land Sorley
recognized this)^it gives a strong presumptive hope in
immortality.
II. Bosanquet.
A. Criticism of Bosanquet& conception of man.
1. He was not above criticism upon the nature
of the self.
Bosanquet was cognizant of the disagreement of
Pringle-Pattison with him upon this subject.
He is resolute that a self must have
freedom and a certain independent status.
He is opposed to any hint of ultimate un-
reality in the self as we knov/ it, to re-
garding it as a character rather than as a
member of the universe, and to suggestions
that its being is likely to be transitory.
He feels, I think, that the value of soul-
making is endangered i£ souls are continually
to be remade.
2
It is when Bosanquet placed himself in direct
opposition to other philosophers that his impersonalism and
Thesis, 5A. Bosanquet, Rev. of "The Idea of
God", by Pringle-pafDison,Mind, 26, 479.
c
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its implications are clearly seen. It is the view of this
thesis that an individual "must have freedom and a certain
independent status", that he i_s "a member of the universe",
that he is not "transitory" , and that there i£ a danger in
souls' continually being remade, if in each creative or
self-transcendent stage, they become less and less personal
until their personality is finally swallowed up in some
abstract, indefinaDle , impersonal something.
Various writers have expressed their opposition
to Bosanquet upon his conception of the self, Pringle-
Pattison, Llerrington ,Leighton,Oakeley,and Stedma.n among
others. ?ringle-pa,ttison objected to the wnole idea of the
overlapping of selves.^ Merrington asserted that the self
is real, "our bed-rock of fact", the place v/here v/e touch
2
reality. He declared tha,t religion,morality, experience
and a true metaphysic of knowledge demand a private center
of experience.-^ To Leighton ,the metaphysics of value and
selfhood presented by Bosanquet was unsatisfactory because
it made no more of the whole as "a spiritual community",
and because it made the principle of totality absorb persons
into an impersonal whole Oakeley repudiates this imperson-
alism because in monism neither the part nor the whole is
personal, because the Neo-Hegelians, viewing- the whole as
real are forced to surrender personality, and because this
conception represented by Bosanquet must "render unintell-
igible the profound experience of personality feeling it-
self to be in contact with reality."
^Pringle-pattison,"The Idea of God": A Reply., Mind
, 28,12-13
^Merrington, PP .Rev. of pattisonS "Hegelianism and personality,
132. 3Ibid. Leighton, "An Estimate of Bosanquet^ Philos-
ophy", Phil.
R
ev.. 32, 630-631.
Boakeley, Hilda D. "personality", EB, XVII, 6l4.
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Stedman has penetrated to the heart of the
doctrine of self-transcendence,^ The root verb "to trans-
cend" niean3"to be more than", "to surpass". Y/hen this be-
comes reflexive, what becomes of the self that surpasses
itself, he asks, Ke answers that in the scheme of Bosanquet
there is no self to begin with, no self- identity , This of
course, does away with the doctrine of self-transcendence,
for there is no self to be transcended. Thus the trans-
cendence is only of motions, tensions , expansions and con-
tr;:!.ctions within the v;hole. There is no self, only tendencies
or "claims" to selfhood. So self- transcendence is not what
it at first appears to be, "a profitable episode in the
history of a self." Llonism both demanded a,nd destroyed this
doctrine, Stedman discovers no place for individual growth
in this system. The benefits of transcendence all ^o to the
Absolute, and for a sufficient reason: Bosanquet could not
credit the individual with his own growth without departing
from monism.
2, He was not clear and consistent on freedom
and the dangers of life
.
Sorley gave a reasonable account of the dangers
to which man is exposed. But Bosanquet with no real self, no
real center of experience and volition, could not write
clearly and consistently of freedom, Sorley appears to be
correct; there is no place for real freedom and purpose in
monism. Bosanque-J,, speaking of existence in a world of claims
and counter-cla,ims, the individual "burdened" by t,he sense
of duty to a superior being, said that the self makes a
Stedman, "An Examination of Bosanquet^ Doctrine of Self-
Transcendence"
, Mind-^ Apr. 162- 163, July 289-302; 307-308,
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"number of demands upon the superior being and upon other"
•
Out of this, somehow, Bosanquet derived the idea that life
is inherently and essentially one of hazard and hardship.^
It is bound to the hazard of
attempting to live by the command of a
superior, which is outside and above it,
an attempt which in the nature of the
case must prove a continual failure....
It is bound to the hardship of constantly
making demands for respect and assistance
from God, nature and our fellow-man.
Had Bosanquet been in possession of the
religious consciousness, the outlook and the"uplook'* of the
Apostle Paul, ^retarding God as a personal Being,A Father
who is desirous of helping His children, and able to do so
through His Spirit who dwells in His children, the hazard
would have disappeared, and it would not be considered a
hardship to ask for the supply of needs. Conscious of the
indwelling Christ, and in a spirit of optimism and power,
Paul cried," I can do all things through Christ who strength-
eneth me.". The great hardships and hazards are not those
inherent in the finite condition of man but in his sinful
condition. This fact end the belief of thousands of people
outside of the Christian faith, even, in an immanent God
either in connection with, or separate from, belief in a
transcendent God Bosanquet ignored.
^Bosanquet ,VDI, 131;
*Ibid, 132.
^Philippians 2: 12-13.
Consciousness, not experience, for Bosanquet had a
religious experience, .^nd could not have had Paul&
experience.
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B« Criticism of Bosanquet*s view of God,
1« Bosanquet was Inconsistent in his
opposition to theism.
He praised
.ifegiG>!l. - or his conception of the
incarnation, and yet he did not carry thst conception to ites
logical end. It was concerning the work of Hegel that he
uttered the following:
Nor has philosophic insight ever
done better service to this history of
religion than in grasping the essence of
Christianity as a unity (not merely the
union) or the divine and human nature,
Hegel had seen the necessity of the incarnation
of deity in human form. Now if deity is not personal, the
doctrine is without significance, Bosanquet knew that in
Hegel* s thought , "God necessarily reveals Himself as a Trinity
of Pex'sons".2 Hegel had declared that "the highest view of
3
God is in terms of Personality or Mind." 'i'he praise of
Bosanquet here is empty, if the incarnation is robbed of its
personal content.
Bosanquet was inconsistent in some respects
also with his own position when he opposed theism. It would
appear that if he had consistently carried out his conception
of the principle of Individuality as the clue to reality that
he would have arrived at the idea of the personality of the
Infinite. He urged that we seek the Infinite in the finite,
and the perfect in the Imperfect.
^osanquet ,PFA, XXIV;
llbld. XXX-XXXII.
Hegel, Encycl of Phil. Science, 204.
r
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The Absolute or infinite should
present itself to us as more of the finite,
or the finite at its best and not at its
ext Inction*^
To be more than a person, the Absolute can
not be less than a person. The individual is not"at its best"
when he is unconscious. Yet Bosanquet has not presented the
Absolute to us as more than the finite or the finite at its
best, but rather at its extinction in the impersonal whole.
It is true that self-transcendence is not a process of self-
extinction, but this is because there is no real self to be-
2
come extinct.
In general, Bosanquet treated God as im-
personal, and yet this was not maintained consistently, for
in a work published after his death, he asked, "What have we
men to do with God*s will?" He divided the question into two
parts: How are we to know what is God's will? and why should
we do God's will? But why talk of God's will if God is not a
person? Vi/111 is a mode of personality. Does this Indicate
that Bosanquet changed his mind just before he died?
In this connection, his Inconsistency is
revealed in the charge of anthropomorphism which he laid at
the door of theism. It should be said first that this did
not touch Sorley, for he has said:
^PIV, 255v
-^hesis.
"iSosanquet ,SP,339.
r
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3
We have not been arguing that God
is good because we find goodness in man,
but that he is good because we find the
idea of goodness to be valid for that
universal orr'er which we are trying to
understand.*
But while the personalist Sorley turns to
the universal order for the clue to reality or the nature
of deity, the inipersonalist Bosanquet, strangely turns to
man, the individual at his best and not at his extinction,
which, of course, must imply personality, for his explanation
of the Infinite, laying himself open to his own charge of
anthropomorphism.
Then, Bosanquet was not consistent upon the
sub.lect of prayer, in its relation to theism. He put forward
8 definition, it is true, that does not necesltete a personal
God,"Meditation" In the same connection, he discarded the
personal terms, 'Father' , 'King* , 'Lord* , and 'Great or* « But et
the heed of the chapter he put a part of the Christian^ prayer
to his heavenly Father: "After this manner therefore prp.y ye..
Thy will be done". Now in view of Bosanquet 's suggestion
that prayer is meditation, we ask Does the Christian pray to
himself? Or does he pray to humanity, which according to
Bosanquet is more or less immanent In him? Is the Christian
praying for his cwn will to be done^' It would seem that
Bosanquet did not mean that the Christian is meditating upon,
or worshipping, himself, for he taught that the religious man
trusts in no strength of his own.^ Then he must mean humanity,
and nature conceived as an impersonal organism. Still prayer
as meditation upon an impersonal organism, is a concection too
isorley,MVIG, 496; 3Thesis,13.
2 Bosanquet, WRI,67;
rr
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foreign to the nature of Christian prayer to be Illustrated
by the form, "Our Father which art in Heaven-", which fears
the idea of a transcendent as well as personal God, both of
which conceptions Bosanquet rejected*
Here another Inconsistency comes to the
surface, the denial of a transcendent God.^^t Bosanquet*s
main doctrine, self-transcendence is meaningless if the
Absolute Is not transcendent as well as Immanent. The Absolute
must be above the person in order for the person to rise to it.
Merrlngton has demonstrated the hopelessness of holding a
doctrine of immanence without counterbalancing it with the
harmonizing principle of transcendence.^
Bosanquet was not consistent in his doctrine
of monism because he hed no transcendent, personal God, fcJorley
showed that either the moral order or the natural order must
be sacrificed In monism. ^Llke Kant, he had a ground on which
these diverse orders could come together, a personal, transcen-
dent God. Bosanquet with no such uniting agency failed to
bring the unity to the universe, though he attempted to do it
in his doctrine of self-transcendence ."^ He strove in vain to
show that the causal forces of nature are related to the moral
purposes of mankind apart from any external Divine Intellect,^
He wavered upon the matter as can be seen in the following
statement
:
^Thesis, 29 with SP,337;
^errington,PR, 214;
'thesis, 24;
4 Bosanquet ,SP, 123-124, 129.
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67
That while it appears to me that
nothing is gained for the interpretation
of the world by the assumption of a di-
vine intellect underlying it, it also
appears that .nothing is determined in
the interpretation of the world by surren-
dering this assumption.
2« Bosanquet was unfair in his attack
upon theism.
One should be fair in making a charge of un-
fairness against another;thus , let it be noted that Bosanquet
was in the main fair in his treatment of other systems. This
is revealed in his work, "The Meeting of Extremes in Contempor-
ary Philosophical Thought". 2lt Is true that he may not have
understood clearly the teachings of theism, but one. In order
to be fair in criticism should understand.
For this reason, Bosanquet was unfair In his
attack upon theism when he misused the terras of the Christian
Revelation, which represents a part of theism. He confused
the words, "make" with "mould", and "salvation" with "creation"
and "shaping". Asking, "How are Souls made?", he answered, "By
a grander system of Salvation than the Christian Religion".'^
Creation and salvation are not the same. Then in the illustra-
whlch
tion of the school/follows , he makes no distinction between,
"Tnake"or "create" and"mould". He said that this "Spirit
Creation"is affected by"three grand materials" acting upon one
another for a series of yearsr intellect , the human heart, and
the world. But Plato pointed out that only the soul is self-
moving
.
^Without a soul or person either in or behind these
materials, Bosanquet has no source of action. This will be
more clear if we consider the illustration. This school, he
3"Rn«iflnauet SP 123* Bosanquet ,VDI, 65;
'^Hornie,lrf M^rco^lam. ^ pia t o , Phaedru s , 245c , &Ha s 1 1 ngs ,
Jour.Phll_. ,20. T?RK,XI,741»
rM • . r
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said, Is instituted for the purpose of teaching little children
to read.
I will call the human heart the horn
book read in that school, and I will call the
child able to reed, the soul made froin that
school and its horn book. Do you not see how
necessary a world of pains and troubles is to
school an intellect, and make it a soul?. ..Not
- merely is the Heart a horn book, it is the
mind's Bible, it is the mind*s experience, it tf:-
is the text from which the Mind or Intellect
sucks its identity. As various as the lives
of men are, so various become their Souls,
and thus God makes individual beings.
Souls, identical Souls of the sparks of
his own essence,^
This, Bosanquet considered a"falnt" sketch
of a system of salvation which will not offend reason. It
is indeed"f8int". In the first place, there is no "salvation",
here in the Christian sense of the term. In the second place
an illustration should illustrate; there should be consist-
ency among the elements; and none of these should be ignored,
at least no essential element. For instance, a teacher is a
necessary factor in an anology drawn from a school. In the
figure above we have the child(soul>, the book(heart), and
the school (world), but where is the teacher? Not God, for
he is represented here as the maker of the child(soul). Who
"instituted" the school? No answer. He said that the school
was instituted for a purpose. But only a person can institute
anything, and have purpose. Yet, strangely, Bosanquet has no
personal God, So he has no original creator, institutor, or
instructor. A child may" suck" knowledge from a book, but
not" identity" or personality. "Grand" indeed is the work of
Bosanquet, VDI, 65-66.
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Impersonal intellect, heart and world, that can five person-
ality to souls. "Grand" indeed is the work of a school that
without a personal institutor and a personal tutor, can im-
part personal identity to students who have no personal
Creator, What is the original source of personality? Bosan-
quet had no answer. Yet he saw no mystery or difficulty in
the origin of personal life.
Once granting that an omnipotent ial
principle, the active form of totality, can
attach itself in an unconscious or a con-
scious state to certain arrangements of
matter, the problem of soul-making, which in
our ignorance, we must accept as stretching
downards to the beginning of life, offers
no difficulty nor myster.^
Once granted that an Impersonal princiole
can attach itself to matter and without any source of person-
ality, the mystery is cleared up. But the difficulty is in,
granting that, Bosanquet will have to have more than an
omnipotent ial principle in order to get consciousness into
unconscious matter. He will have to have more tha§^abstract
Impersonal principle for it to decide (an alternative in this,
calling for a choice) whether it will make matter conscious
or unconscious. High sounding and abstract words In illustrat-
ions that do not illustr'^te can never cover up the lack in an
impersonal system, nor give aubstance to an attack UDon the
consistent Christian conception of a personal God as the First
Cause, the final explanation of all things and persons.
The unfairness of Bosanquet is his attitude
toward theism is seen also in his charge that it is guilty of
^ Bosanquet ,VDI, 78.
f
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evasion when It says that God actuates or produces the free
as free, and that God Is only a true Creator if he creates
creators. For not only did Bosanquet misuse the terms "create"
and "mould", but he mistook "literal" ( in the expression,"
Cod a literal Creator") for "Absolute" or "Pinal", and "detail"
for" full content". If theism asserts that God is the only
moulding influence on the soul, or that He gives it its full
content at creation or birth, then Bosanquet was right, but
only then. He said, "To will a will is to will its detail".
Now, it is true that in order to will a will that God must have
Its essential nature in mind. But it is not true that he must
think, jnuch less determine, its final and complete content, in
so doing. If it be true, for instance, that God made man*s will
after the pattern of His own divine will, (as at least some
thelsts assert )then He willed to man the power to choose freely.
This constitutes the essential nature of man's will; no more
is needed, and anything more would make it unlike God*s will,
for anything more would determine the will of man. Theism
asserts no more on this point than free will. Nor does a
theist necessarily interpret his consciousness of the universe
as"a consciousness of independent beings"2,for finite beings
may have free will plus a sense of dependence; in fact to be
finite, (and religious )implies that. Bovvne, a theist, said,
that persons are relatively independent of the Divine Person'.^
Thus a fair view of theism would not consider it guilty of evas-
ion*
^Bosanquet, VDI, 136;
fibid. 136-137;
Bowne, M. 102.
r
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C. Criticism of Bosanquet's conception of
the future life,
1* He did not take the principle of the
stability and safety of souls to its logical
conclusion.
It is strange that Bosanquet did not carry
farther his principle of the stability and safety of souls,
and make them really stable and eternally safe. To be con-
sistent, he should have done this. For he called the intell-
igences, or sparks of the divine that are not souls until they
acquire an identity,"God'*«^God, as he used the term here, is
divine. So that unless Bosanquet insisted (which he did not)
that the intelligence changes its nature when it becomes a
soul, it is divine, and therefore, as Plato urged, immortal,
Bosanquet affirmed as part of his main thesis that the indiv-
idual is always in the Absolute .^Bat this Absolute is the
totality of exT'^rience .^What is experience, however, if it is
not conscious?
He did not go where he usually went for
the answer to problems.
It is strange also, that Bosanquet did not
find an answer to the question of a future conscious exist-
ence in the field to which otherwise he constantly appealed--
religion. We may ignore the fact that he found no answer in
the realms of philosophy and ethics, where Sorley seemed to
find a satisfactory solution of the problem. But why did not
Bosanquet declare what has been a characteristic conviction
of the religious consciousness practically throughout its
^Bosanquet, VDI;
4^Ibido6B, footnote:
*^Thesis,42,
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history in all time and in all lands? Why did he not trust
upon this point the testimony of the experience of the relig-
ious man which he called "the clue to reality"?^ Ho was not
true to religious experience and the religious consciousness
when he denied that the question of survival of beings has any
2
special interest to religion. He acknowledged, as has been shovm
that it is natural to believe in extension of life, that it
is wide spread among the nations, and that in the form of
meliorism it is in many present day philosophies. He did not
dare to say that the student or statesman, who desired contin-
uation of life in order to complete his work, was wrong.^
yet he thought that the vast masses had other ideas. This may
be true concerning the motive of desire for future existence,
but not of the desire itself.
He argued on the basis of an unnatural
desire.
And it is upon the basis of desire that
Bosanquet argued. He asked, "What destiny can we consistently
desire?", and answers,"No one will much object to an iden-
tification of the self in the main with the things we mainly
care for" o'*5Since the matter is placed upon this basis of
personal desire, let it be said that it is an unnatural desire
that prompts the acceptance of amy immortality of principles
as a substitute for hope in a conscious future existenceo
Men for the most part, at least, want life, eternal life, even
though it be no better than the life which they now enjoy.
To be as good as this life it must be conscious. Millions
^^^^ ^^^^^ ^l^h that desire. No one wants to say an
"TlhllT? It • ! Bosanquet, VDI, 260o^ inesis,.7 *Ibid. andSlSE;g4;
t
73
eternal "good-by to his loved ones. Barbelllon, constantly
disappointed in life, and dying early in life, triumphed in
death, rising to a sublime hope in immortality; he believed
that such love as he bore his wife would never die. Further-
more, Sorley seems reasonable in saying that the principles
which men desire to see perpetuated are such as can be perpet-
uated only by persons. "If perpetuated eternally, they must be
perpetuated by eternal persons* One would rather look after
his own interests. After all the problem of personal immortal-
ity ^ a personal problem. Bosanquet recognized this when he
put the matter upon the basis of personal desire#
^ Barbellion, JDM;
2 Thesis,46-47
f4
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toUMMRY
Thus it has been seen that Bosanquet and
Sorley regarded man as an intellectual, social, moral, and
religious being, that neither emphasized the intellectual
aspect, and that Bosanquet laid the stress upon the social
and religious aspects while iSorley dwelt largely upon the
moral nature of man, Qtosanquet saw in man thus, a finite-
infinite creature who revealed his true individuality in
association both with his fellov/-men and the Absolute.
Sorley, on the other hand, saw true individuality in the
exercisse by man of thoice, especially of the values of
life, and held that the individual should be evaluated in
the light also of unrealized values and his uniqueness.
Both Bosanquet and Sorley looked upon man
as a free being; both rejected trivial choices as a test
of freedom, Bosanquet placing freedom in the great logical
choices, and in the contact of man with the whole; Sorley
placing freedom in the moral choices, and in man's relation
to values, the choice of which was in God's mind for man
when he rrEBde him a free being. It was Sorley who seemed to
grasp most clearly the importance of freedom, viewing it in
the light of the unity of reality, and value. Both writers
saw that freedom carried with it a danger; Bosanquet
seeing its source in the finite condition of man and in
the pleasures and pains of life, Sorley sensing danger in
the abuse of freedom and in possible final failure to
fulfil the purposes of God. Both saw that freedom in man
t
75
is limited; Bosanquet limiting man in his relation to the
Absolute, while Sorley placed the limitation in man& relation
to nature and to God, Both writers recognized that determ-
inism,materialism and naturalism have no place for the free-
dom of man. But Sorley goes beyond and declares that the
theories of monism and the "strongest motive" destroy human
freedom. For Bosanquet, freedom lay in the spiritual, super-
sensuous world, while for Sorley it lies in the self and
time •
Both Bosanquet and Sorley believed that real-
ity can be known. The former rejecting the interpretations
of materialism, pluralism and theism, denied that time, the
self
(
per se ) and the divine Self are real, and declared
that the Absolute is real, other things and persons having
reality only to the extent of their absorption in this
whole, Sorley rejecting materialism, anti-theistic plural-
ism and monism, discovers reality in existents, that is,
persons ( inxjluding the supreme person)
,
things and organic
life, in relations and in values, but making the qualifi-
cation that persons alone have intrinsic value. The diverse
viev^s of our two writers are seen upon the subject of the
relation of persons to reality. Bosanquet looked at the
problem from the standpoint of the Absolute; Sorley from the
standpoint of the individual.
In regard to the goal of the individual, life
or adaptation to environment, or self-preservation, was not
considered by Bosanquet, and was definitely rejected by
Sorley. Both think happiness is an unv^orthy goal.
Bosanquet puts forward, instead, absorption
f1.
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into the Absolute, while Sorley suggests goodness as the
true ideal • Each man refuses to accept the contribution
that the other makes in the matter,
Bosanquet found no solution- of the problem
of immortality in the fields of ethics, philosophy and
religion. Hence, though he talked of eternal life, it was
not in the sense of prolongation of life, not conscious
future existence of the person, involving, as he thought
the conception of a compensation awaiting man in the future,
but rather in the sense of completeness of life in the pres-
ent, the prolongation of the influence and the values of the
individual in the life of the race. But, strangely,he des-
cribed this complete life in the present as eternal progress,
seemingly making a distinction that denoted no difference,
admitting progress"undnding" but not progres3"ad infinitum, "
What Bosanquet re J ected, Sorley held, with the possible
exception of compensatio n which he did not discuss.
Finally, while Sorley offered a logical picture
of G-od and man, Bosanquet in his impersonalism was led to
unfortunate views of the nature of God and of the nature and
destiny of man. Throughout the comparison, Sorley has
presented the more reasonable, adequate and satisfactory
account of personality.
t
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